Obstacles on the Road to Ecumenism in Present-Day Ukraine: A Psycho-Sociological Analysis
Report for a conference at the Papal Oriental Institute,
Rome, 26 May, 2001
(Written by Myroslav Marynovych, director of the Institute of Religion and Society in Lviv, Ukraine. Mr. Marynovych, a well-known dissident in Soviet times and founding member of Amnesty International in Ukraine, is now a leading ecumenist and scholar on the Ukrainian social and religious scene.)
In this report I will attempt to answer the following fundamental questions:
- what influence does the burdens of history have on the attitude of Ukrainians towards ecumenism
- how should we evaluate the experience of ecumenical dialogue in the 1990s and its influence on Ukrainian religious processes
- what will be the task of the Churches of Ukraine in future ecumenical dialogue
I. The influence of the burdens of history on the attitude of Ukrainians towards ecumenism
The attitudes of contemporary Ukrainians towards the phenomenon and even the very concept of ecumenism are various and are strongly influenced by history. In general, scholars are of the opinion that in Ukraine (especially in Orthodox circles) there are such marked idiosyncracies regarding the ecumenical movement that the very term "ecumenism" turns on the signal for danger and distrust in many people. I will share what I think are the most important among the many reasons for this lack of acceptance.
1. In the memory of the older generation (especially believers) the idea of ecumenism is closely associated with the international politics of the post-war Kremlin. As part of the so-called "struggle for peace" the Kremlin worked to use international Christian organizations for its own purposes and, to a significant degree, manipulated their desires to establish Christian peace in Europe and the world. And so, under the influence of the Kremlin, the placement of missiles of a normal radius of activity was more often a topic for discussion at sessions of the Christian Peace Conference and the World Council of Churches than the question of the defense of the religious rights of believers in the USSR itself. A bad taste was left in the mouth from this kind of deceit; this is what remains of everything that was associated with the great policies of the Kremlin. The utilitarian character of Soviet ecumenism was officially acknowledged at the end of 1995 by Metropolitan Kiril Gundiaev, a direct participant in previous and present ecumenical meetings. Therefore, in the minds of many Ukrainians the whole idea of ecumenism is still associated with "the intrigues of Moscow."
2. In addition, the Catholic model of ecumenism, which calls for the acknowledgement of the primacy of the Pope of Rome, is of course different from the Orthodox model. This has led and continues to lead another group of Ukrainians to talk about "the intrigues of the Vatican." These attitudes became even stronger after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the sphere of influence of various Christian Churches began to be re-divided. Therefore the ecumenical position of the Vatican was criticized not only by Orthodox but even by Ukrainians who were generally pro-Catholic (especially in the diaspora). This was because the so-called Ost politik of the Vatican, which lay at the basis of its ecumenical initiatives, was, in the eyes of these Ukrainians, too "pro-Moscow" to be strictly ecumenical.
3. In the 1990s the crisis of the ecumenical movement became apparent. Abstracting from the concrete positions of each side, one could say that the collapse of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union revealed how the ecumenism of the 1960s to 1980s had too great a connection to the geopolitical status quo. It seems that, simply because the geopolitical balance of power changed, the established achievements of ecumenism were "gone with the wind." The political subtext of certain ecumenical contacts became obvious. This brought about a distrust towards the ecumenical movement in general in the hearts of more sceptical Ukrainians. What should have been reconciliation between Christians had gained, in their eyes, the appearance of a mutual agreement about spheres of influence.
4. The interests of the world centers of the three branches of Christianity, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant, converged in Ukraine. Practical experience shows that this very region is, one might say, the "polygon of ecumenical experiments" in our time. It is here that the sincerity of ecumenical declarations and the solidity of hard-won agreements are tested. (For example, how many times has the Russian Orthodox Church announced that its position towards the Catholic Church depends on how the latter solves the "Uniate question" in the western areas of Ukraine.)
Ukrainian Churches are at this time more objects than subjects in the ecumenical process. Up to the present they have not been able to determine their own fate, remaining dependent on ecclesial schemes which others have proposed. Sometimes the antagonisms between the various "powers of this Christian world" have forced the Ukrainian Churches to break off even those contacts which were made in Ukraine. (A classic example: Uniates and Orthodox began the process of reconciliation and theological dialogue in 1680 at the Lublin Synod [Colloquium Lublinese]. They were forced to stop. The main reason for this was that the Latin clergy, most importantly the Papal Nuncio in Poland, had negative attitudes towards the synod.)
And so the religious fate of Ukrainians has all too often been decided without them, and this has not led them to trust ecumenical dialogue nor has it formed among Ukrainian Christians the spirit of partnership and initiative. As a result, the responsibility for this distrust in the ecumenical movement lies not only with these Ukrainians (though they are responsible, of course) but also with those centers of world Christianity which have to a significant degree influenced in the past and continue today to influence the religious history of Ukraine.
II. The experience of ecumenical dialogue in the 1990s and its influence on Ukrainian religious processes
Most importantly, what comes to mind when analyzing the ecumenical dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1990s is the radically different attitudes of each side to the very concept of dialogue. For the Roman Catholic Church the necessity of dialogue took an almost absolute character: Vatican diplomats in their fear of losing contacts with the Orthodox often invoked the phrase "dialogue at any cost." At the present time Orthodox under the jurisdiction of Moscow consider such dialogue useful only for the Catholic side: they believe that it simply serves as a cover for Catholic expansionism through proselytism.
The lessons of history show that dialogue becomes fruitful and constructive when all the participants see no other alternative. On the contrary, in the interdenominational relations in Eastern Europe that we are evaluating one side is convinced that an alternative to dialogue still exists. From numerous publications in the press under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate the following line of thought can be re-constructed: the present situation, with various denominations and religious pluralism (particularly in Ukraine), is artificial and temporary because its cause is the weakness of the government. In these conditions Orthodoxy cannot (and shall not) enter into ecumenical dialogue, for this might lead to severe losses. The main strategy, therefore, is to wait until Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are again united, which will lead to a new and radical re-distribution of power to the advantage of Russian Orthodoxy. The Moscow Patriarchate will only be able to enter into dialogue when it is in a position of greater strength.
Ecumenical dialogue also supposes that all the participants share one and the same values. In the case under consideration, there is at least one value, religious freedom, which the two sides evaluate in often radically different ways. So the Moscow Patriarchate treats the revival of the Ukrainian Greco Catholic Church in Ukraine exclusively as a consequence of Catholic proselytism and the interference of the government, giving no consideration to the right of Ukrainian citizens freely to choose their religious affiliation.
Yet another peculiarity of the present phase of the ecumenical dialogue is the question of the authority to represent certain religious groups. In the ecumenical processes of the second half of the 20th century the Russian Orthodox Church traditionally appeared as the single representative of all the varied Christian communities of the vast region under its influence. This gave Moscow a special monopoly in conducting ecumenical dialogues in this part of the world. At the end of the last century it was clear that His Holiness Pope John Paul II was ready to enter into dialogue with any Churches which were willing to. Traveling to Romania, the Pope strengthened the dialogue with the Romanian Orthodox Church which was already going on, in part, through the mediation of the World Council of Churches. Traveling to Georgia, the Pope for the first time began a direct dialogue with Christians of the post-soviet area. Traveling to Ukraine, the Pope will for the first time enter the land of the Eastern Slavs, where there are a number of Christians who would like to engage in dialogue with the outside Christian world, but who, up until now, have not had the opportunity.
The intrigue of the present moment lies in the question of which will prevail: the desire of all Christians of the Byzantine tradition (with the exception of the Orthodox under Moscow's jurisdiction) to enter into relations as partners with the worldwide Christian community or the ultimatum of the Moscow Patriarchate, announced by the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan, that relations with the Vatican will be suspended if such contacts occur between the Vatican and these other Churches.
In other words, at the beginning of the 21st century the question arose with special force: will the ecumenical dialogue with Christians of the post-soviet area continue through only one channel (that is, only through the mediation of Moscow) or will pastoral concerns outweigh political concerns and will other Churches, in particular the Ukrainian Churches, join in the dialogue to the degree that they are prepared to do so? Joining in the dialogue has a special meaning in this instance if untying the complex knot of interdenominational problems in Ukraine depends to a significant extent on the position of these, until now, isolated partners. The near future will provide an answer to this question.
III. The task of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches of Autocephalous Status regarding future ecumenical dialogue
Including the above-mentioned Churches in ecumenical relations in the future will demand much of these Churches themselves. The clergy and faithful of these Churches must prove that they are worthy to be the "architects" of their own future. In modern terms this means that they must learn successfully how to overcome all the dangerous syndromes of the recent past-- the "martyr complex," the "conquerors of Communism" complex and also tendencies in the direction of nationalism, excessive politicization and so on. Much has already been accomplished in this area, though significantly more remains to be done in the future.
The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in particular has the serious task of receiving the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, to feel and to understand what her own aggiornamento should look like. I myself think special attention should be given to renewing methods of pastoral ministry and evangelization.
Admitting the wide range of problems which today face the Ukrainian Churches, I would at the same time warn my listeners about the dangers of stereotyping and the danger of understanding religious processes in Ukraine superficially. Let us take a closer look, for example, at the previously mentioned tendency to nationalism. This is often given as the reason why the world Christian community is not hurrying to enter into full relations with these Churches. On the one hand, it is indisputably true that the faithful, the clergy and even individual hierarchs of some Churches use the rhetoric of "protecting the nation," rhetoric, which those in the West perceive to be synonymous with nationalism. The long period of persecution has left such strongly negative feelings in the hearts of some believers that it is difficult even to call these feelings Christians. Consequently, re-educating these believers about the evangelical mission of Christians in this world is an urgent priority for these Churches.
On the other hand, it is methodologically incorrect to judge the consequences without even looking at their causes. One sometimes gets the impression that religious processes in Western and in Eastern Europe are in different phases of the cycle. In the post-war period Western European society (Christians being a part of it) made great efforts to overcome nationalistic tendencies and to create an atmosphere of tolerance and cooperation. And so the Western vector of development encourages mutual coming together, partnership, overcoming differences, removing all possible obstacles on the road to unity. Therefore it is difficult for Western Christians to understand why what seems on first glance to be a qualitatively different process is occurring in Ukraine -- Ukrainian Christians are attempting to assert their own separate religious identity and to distinguish this from Russian identity. That is, the efforts of a significant part of Ukrainian Christians are directed towards separating themselves from that Church body which suppressed Ukrainian religious traditions and national forms of religious self-determination. In order to be certain of their own identity, they must make a dividing line between "us" and "them," concentrating on what distinguishes them from others. Namely, they must do exactly what is not approved of in the West today.
Does this mean that Ukrainian Christians are not able to embrace modern European values? One might be inclined to make such a conclusion if one were not well acquainted with the causes of this previously described conflict. The seeming "universalism" of Russian Orthodoxy, which supports the desire to maintain a status quo which is unjust to Ukrainian Christians, seems to be for Western Europe more familiar and easier to accept than the attempts of Ukrainian Christians to separate themselves from what they consider to be ecclesiastical imperialism. In this case the nationalistic overtones of the weaker party, which has lived through persecution, seem to be more threatening to the Christian oikumene than the Pan-Slavic overtones of Russian Orthodoxy, which would seem to be free of such nationalism. Such an aberrant perspective can be explained in the following strange way: under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate this territory was calm and peaceful in the 1960s and 1970s; but then in the 1990s, when the so-called "national" Churches of Ukraine were reborn, interdenominational frictions and conflicts arose. Was, however, this peace and calm a truly Christian peace, and are the struggles of the Ukrainian Churches to find a place for themselves under the Christian sun truly reprehensible? Is not such an illusory peace farther from the hoped-for ecumenical ideal than attempts to work for a more just status quo?
Regardless of everything that I have said, Ukrainian Christians are of course still obliged to love even those who curse them. This challenge of Christ lifts us above all political, national and ecclesiastical causes and it is, finally, only the categorical imperative which incites a gentle revolution in human hearts. Nevertheless, though we hope that Ukrainian Christians will maintain the major tenets of their faith and love even those who deny them the right to have their own Churches, it is impossible not to note the very fact that those who curse them do exist. More precisely, it is impossible to suppose that those who curse are the better Christians and that they alone deserve to enter into ecumenical dialogue.
In conclusion, allow me with one final stroke to illustrate how the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church is working to meet its ecumenical obligations. It became clear in the 1990s that the faithful of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church understood the nature of ecumenism, its tasks and its goals, in different ways. In time it also became clear that the Church will not be able to move ahead and take an active part in the ecumenical process if it has not attempted to direct these various attitudes and perceptions towards a golden mean. At the initiative of His Beatitude Lubomyr Cardinal Husar a group was formed to work on creating "The Concept of the Ecumenical Position of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church." A proposal for such a "Concept" was published in 2000 in Meta (The Goal), the Church's official newspaper, with the goal of furthering the discussion and fine-tuning the document. I think that this is a comforting sign which allows us to look on the ecumenical future of our Church with optimism.
